ABSTRACT Motivated by the practice from Walmart in China, we investigate Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing (BPOF) contract by considering a supply chain consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and one well-capitalized retailer. The supplier is a small enterprise and cannot get financing from banks independently. In order to get funds for the supplier's production, three parties (the retailer, supplier and bank) reach a BPOF contract. In this contract, the retailer provides credit guarantee for the supplier's loan. As the loan guarantor, the retailer determines the amount of credit guarantee. The bank provides the supplier with the loan as the retailer requests. Then, the supplier gets the loan and determines production quantity. Finally, the market demand is realized and the retailer places order to the supplier. After the supplier delivers products and gets order payment, he can repay the loan. According to BPOF contract, if the order payment is insufficient to repay the loan, the retailer has to compensate the bank for the loss. To identify the optimal decisions for the retailer and supplier, we develop a two-stage Stackelberg game, in which the retailer is leader and the supplier is follower. We find that BPOF contract can help mitigate the supplier's financial distress and improve the retailer's revenue. In addition, we show that how the optimal decisions are affected by the supplier's initial capital and supply chain members' inventory risk. Our study further gives suggestions to supply chain management practices: small suppliers should take advantage of the retailer's high credit for financing, and the retailers who cooperate with small suppliers should maintain a good credit rating.
I. INTRODUCTION
This study is motivated by the practice that we observe from Walmart. In China, Walmart has tens of thousands of upstream suppliers, many of which are small enterprises. Due to asymmetry of information and lack of collateral, small enterprises are often confronted with difficulties in financing from financial institutions. As a result, these small suppliers are budget-constrained in production. The shortage of funds incurs great risks to the breakdown of production process and insufficient supply for Walmart. In other words, small suppliers' difficulty in financing not only generates huge losses for suppliers themselves, but creates pressure for downstream
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retailers such as Walmart. Although Walmart could replace all small suppliers with large and well-capitalized suppliers to ensure the sufficient supply, it is not a good choice for three reasons. Firstly, the price advantage of small suppliers is critical for Walmart to achieve its low price competitive advantage. Secondly, switching to new suppliers may bring new costs for Walmart, which offset the benefits from new suppliers to some degree. Thirdly, some small suppliers have near-monopoly in specific varieties of products. As a consequence, Walmart does not search for new large suppliers. Nevertheless, Walmart has the motivation to help its existing small suppliers on financing and funding before production.
In real practice, Walmart assists its small suppliers through Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing (BPOF) contract. To be specific, Walmart provides credit guarantee for its small suppliers to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), one of the biggest commercial banks in China.
It is difficult for these small suppliers to get financing from financial institutions independently. However, they can get loans from ICBC with Walmart's credit guarantee, because Walmart has a high credit rating, and these small suppliers have a long-term business relationship with Walmart. Through BPOF contract, Walmart's credit guarantee serves as a form of collateral for small suppliers' bank loan [1] . When the loan is due, the small suppliers repay the bank loan by the purchase order payment with Walmart. Since the market demand is random, Walmart cannot inform its suppliers the exact order amount until the actual demand arrives. Hence, the order payment that suppliers can get is uncertain and may not sufficient to cover the loan's principal and interest. However, ICBC has no need to worry about this uncertainty, as Walmart has guaranteed to compensate ICBC's loss in BPOF contract. To conclude, BPOF contract enables small suppliers to get financing for production from banks by utilizing the advantage of retailer's high credit rating (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 ). In China, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role in economic development. According to Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2019: An OECD Scoreboard [2] , SMEs account for more than 98% of all enterprises in China. Moreover, they contributed 58% of GDP and 50% of tax revenue in 2018. However, due to asymmetric information, little collateral, and high default risk, financing has often been identified as an obstacle for SMEs [3] , [4] . The rejection rate for SMEs' bank loan application is nearly three times that for large enterprises. Even if a SME's bank loan application is accepted, on average only 53.1% of funding amounts requested are finally granted. To promote SMEs' financing and funding, various innovations have emerged [5] , [6] . In this paper, we try to contribute to this landscape by investigating Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing contract.
In BPOF contract, a series of questions need to be answered. For Walmart, the first and the most natural question is: Should Walmart offer a credit guarantee? Once the contingent compensation is realized, this would mean unnecessary cost for Walmart. Therefore, how should Walmart balance the benefit from adequate product supply and cost from offering credit guarantee? If Walmart initiates a BPOF contract, other questions arise: how much credit guarantee should Walmart offer? What factors affect Walmart's optimal decision? For the supplier, as Walmart cannot inform the exact order amount until the actual demand arrives, how many products should the supplier produce in advance? If the supplier produces few but the realized demand is high, it loses sales. If the supplier produces many but the realized demand is low, it incurs unnecessary production costs. In this paper, we try to answer these questions and identify the optimal decisions for both Walmart and suppliers.
Although BPOF contract is derived from Walmart practice in China, it is applicable to a wide variety of industries that have financing needs for small enterprises' production. In fact, BPOF contract is gradually expanding as a conventional supply chain financing contract in China's practices. However, little research has been done on this novel financing scheme. This paper tries to fill this gap.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After a relevant literature review in the next section, we explain settings and establish a two-period model with BPOF contract in Section III. In Section IV and V, based on the magnitude of supplier's initial capital, we analyze the model and derive the optimal decisions under two cases, respectively. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper and offers some future research directions.
For convenience, we will use ''he'' and ''she'' to represent the supplier and retailer involved in the supply chain, respectively, in the remainder sections.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Our research relates to two research streams -financing and funding for SMEs, and supply chain finance. We review the two areas, respectively, in this section.
In the past two decades, numerous attempts have been made to find a way to assess SMEs' credit risk and to reduce information asymmetry between SMEs and financial institutions [7] . Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary [8] collect VOLUME 7, 2019 11 financial ratios of 1363 SMEs in Asia, and employ principal component analysis and cluster analysis with the data. By doing this, they provide a scheme for assigning credit ratings to SMEs. In addition, nationwide SME databases have been established in several countries, such as Credit Risk Database (CRD) in Japan and Public Credit Registries in Malaysia. Kuwahara et al. [9] analyze the characteristics of Japan's CRD and conclude that CRD can create reliable scoring models for assessment of SMEs' risk. Furthermore, the problem that how to provide financing for SMEs in a reasonable way has also been studied [5] . Evidence suggests that credit guarantee scheme can reduce the risk of green finance and induce private participation in green finance and investment, because part of the risk is alleviated by the government [10] . Moreover, a theoretical model has been developed to determine the government's optimal credit guarantee ratio [1] . The research concludes that the optimal credit guarantee ratio is affected by three factors: government policy, macroeconomic conditions, and banks' behavior.
Most of the above researches consider SMEs' financing from the perspectives of banks or governments. Motivated by Walmart's practice in China, we suppose that the SMEs' financing problem can also be considered in the viewpoint of the supply chain. In a supply chain, a member enterprise has incentives to help other member enterprises to get financing. Our paper strives to contribute to this landscape by investigating a new financing contract, Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing (BPOF) contract.
Another relevant stream of literature is on supply chain finance. The history of supply chain finance can be tracked back to the 1970s [11] . For example, [12] study the effect of trade credit and inventories on the net cash flow generated in business operations. Haley and Higgins [13] consider the basic lot-size model and study the relationship between inventory policy and trade credit policy. Later, as the issue of exploring corporates' financial flows associated with supply chains attracted more and more attention, scholars started to investigate ''supply chain finance'' problem in a systematic way. Buzacott and Zhang [14] were the first to demonstrate the importance of joint consideration of production and financing decisions. To do so, they model the available cash in each period as a function of assets and liabilities that may be updated periodically according to the dynamics of the production activities. In order to characterize the optimization of the cost of capital with supply chains, Pfohl and Gomm [15] propose a conceptual framework and a mathematical model of supply chain finance. Their model shows that supply chain finance is profitable for both supply chain members and capital markets under certain general conditions. In addition, based on the framework they proposed, all supply chain financing instruments can be classified into two categories, ''internal financing'' and ''external financing''.
''Internal financing'' refers to financing among supply chain members without participation of financial institutions. The most widely used internal financing instrument is trade credit. Trade credit is the credit extended by a seller to a buyer when the goods or services are bought on credit. It facilitates the purchase without immediate payment [16] . Gupta and Wang [17] investigate the retailer's operations with random demand, and prove that the structure of the optimal policy is not affected by credit terms. Chang [18] view trade-credit from a supplier's perspective, and present it as a tool for supply chain coordination.
In contrast, ''external financing'' means that suppliers or retailers in a supply chain complete financing in presence of financial institutions. Kouvelis and Xu [19] develop a supply chain theory of factoring and reverse factoring, and show that in what condition these post-shipment financing schemes should be adopted. Lekkakos and Serrano [20] study the impact of reverse factoring schemes on suppliers' operational decisions and performance. The authors model a supplier's inventory replenishment problem as a multi-stage dynamic program and derive the supplier's optimal inventory policy for two cases: no access to external financing, and access to external financing through reverse factoring or traditional factoring. Bi et al. [21] consider a supply chain consisting of a well-capitalized manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer. To help the retailer get financing for a purchase order, the manufacturer promises to pay the lender a proportion of the retailer's loan if the retailer goes broke.
Some scholars compare internal financing instruments with external financing instruments, in order to find the retailer's and supplier's preferences. For example, Cai et al. [22] study the roles of bank and trade credits with a capital constrained retailer. Either in a single-credit scenario or in a dual-credit scenario, they evaluate the retailer's optimal order quantity and the creditors' optimal credit limits and interest rates. In addition, they use empirical panel data to verify the substitutability and complementarity between the two credits. Tang and Cai [23] compare the reverse factoring with direct prepayment. They examine a supply chain with one capital-constrained supplier and one well-capitalized retailer, and find that the retailer prefers reverse factoring than direct prepayment if the retailer can reach a long credit term. Kouvelis and Zhao [24] consider a supply chain where both the retailer and supplier are capital constrained. The retailer can use both trade credits and short-term bank loans, and the supplier can use the retailer's early payment and/or short-term bank loans. They show the retailer's and supplier's preferences under different conditions. Different with existed literature, our research has two main contributions. First, most literature on supply chain finance, especially on external financing, view the retailer as capital-constrained and the supplier as a well-capitalized big enterprise. In contrast, we consider another scenario where the supplier is a small enterprise with budget constraint and the retailer is well-capitalized. We try to investigate events and decision process in this scenario and identify the optimal decisions for the retailer and supplier.
Second, we study a novel financing scheme, Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing (BPOF) contract. BPOF contract is based on credit guarantee scheme, and the guarantee itself is a form of collateral. In specific, BPOF contract is different from factoring or reverse factoring, which are two popular financing contracts in industry. Compared with factoring, BPOF contract aims to promote suppliers financing rather than retailers. Compared with reverse factoring, BPOF contract requires the supplier to repay bank loans by purchase order rather than accounts receivable. These differences distinguish BPOF contract and may bring new findings.
III. SETTINGS AND MODEL
We consider a stylized supply chain consisting of one capital-constrained supplier and one well-capitalized retailer. The supplier produces a type of product at unit cost, c, and sells to end customers via the retailer. Suppose all the information of the supplier and retailer is common knowledge to the supply chain members. The supplier and retailer are both risk-neutral; they make the optimal decisions to maximize their expected profits, respectively. The transaction between the supplier and retailer is based on a wholesale price contract and a pull system. That is, the retailer purchases the products from the supplier at a wholesale price, w, and then sells to customers at a retail price, p. In the pull system, the retailer places order to the supplier immediately when the random market demand D is realized. Since the supplier is budget constrained with a limited initial capital, B, his production capacity is only B/c units of products unless he gets financing before production. However, the supplier cannot get financing from banks independently, because he is a small enterprise with low credit rating.
Since the inadequate supply may decrease the retailer's profits, the retailer has incentive to help the supplier get financing before production. To this end, the retailer, supplier and bank reach a Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing (BPOF) contract. In this contract, the retailer provides credit guarantee for the supplier's loan. Since the retailer is an established firm with high credit rating, the bank is willing to provide loan to the supplier with the retailer's guarantee. As the loan guarantor, the retailer determines the amount of credit guarantee, M , and the bank provides the supplier a loan as the retailer requests. For the convenience of description, we will refer to M as ''the retailer's credit guarantee'' or ''credit guarantee'' below. Then, the supplier gets the loan and determines production quantity, Q. Finally, the market demand, D, is realized and the retailer places order to the supplier. As the supplier has inventory Q, he can deliver the retailer min(Q, D) products and get order payment w min(Q, D) from the retailer. Fig. 3 shows the sequence of events in our model.
Suppose that the loan interest rate is r. All c, w, p, B and r are assumed to be exogenous, and D is assumed as a continuous random variable, whose PDF and CDF are f (·) and F(·), respectively. As a convention, we letF(·) = 1 − F(·) and
We denote x + := max{x, 0}. See Table 1 for the notations of our analysis. Moreover, we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 1 implies that the interest rate is no greater than either the supplier's profit margin or the retailer's profit margin. It is reasonable because otherwise the supplier and/or retailer would not engage in business operations, which leads to a meaningless situation in our model.
When the loan is due, the supplier needs to repay M (1 + r) to the bank. If w min(Q, D) ≥ M (1+r), the supplier is able to pay off the loan. If w min(Q, D) < M (1 + r), the retailer has to compensate the bank's loss. For the retailer, the potential risk to compensate is a cost of providing credit guarantee for the supplier.
Note that if the supplier's production quantity is so small that w min(Q, D) < M (1 + r) always holds, then the retailer has to compensate no matter how large the realized market demand is. Hence, it is reasonable that the retailer requires a lower bound to be imposed on the supplier's production quantity, to ensure that the supplier is able to repay the loan when the market demand is large. Denote Q L (M ) as the lower bound, then
We establish a model based on a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the retailer is leader and the supplier is follower. The retailer determines credit guarantee, M , and the supplier determines production quantity, Q. In the following, we will investigate each player's optimal decision in reverse order. That is, we first study the supplier's production quantity decision, and then the retailer's credit guarantee decision. For convenience, we herein follow this sequence to set up our model.
A. SUPPLIER'S PRODUCTION QUANTITY
Given the retailer's credit guarantee, M , the supplier determines his optimal production quantity, Q * , to maximize his expected profit. The supplier's expected profit is
which is concave, and the maximizer is Q P =F −1 (c/w). This is consistent with the supplier's optimal production quantity in the newsvendor model with no budget constraint.
Even with BPOF contract, the supplier still has no power to produce infinitely. Denote by
his production capacity. Considering the bounds imposed on the supplier's production quantity, Q * ∈ [Q L (M ), Q U (M )] should always be ensured.
To characterize the optimal production quantity decision, we define two critical values, M 1 and M 2 , as
It is easily to show M 1 ≤ cQ P ≤ M 2 ≤ wQ P and the following equivalent conditions,
B. RETAILER'S CREDIT GUARANTEE
Anticipating the impact of credit guarantee on the supplier's optimal production quantity, the retailer needs to choose her optimal credit guarantee, M * , to maximize her expected profit,
In the following, we analyze the supply chain members' optimal decisions. When B ≥ cQ P , the supplier has the capability to produce Q P units of products without BPOF contract. Hence, we regard the supplier's initial capital as high if B ≥ cQ P , and low otherwise. Our analysis will be done in the two cases, respectively.
For convenience, we make the following definition. Definition 1: For a gap function (x 1 , x 2 ) = R (x 1 ) − R (x 2 ) whose value can be both positive and negative, define a function δ(x 1 , x 2 ) as
IV. SUPPLIER'S INITIAL CAPITAL IS HIGH A. SUPPLIER'S OPTIMAL PRODUCTION QUANTITY

Theorem 1: Given the retailer's credit guarantee, M , the supplier's optimal production quantity is
Proof:
, and thus Q * = Q L (M ). The proof is complete.
B. RETAILER'S OPTIMAL CREDIT GUARANTEE
By substituting Q * implied by Theorem 1 into (5), the retailer's profit function becomes:
It can be verified that R (M ) is continuous in M . Its first order derivative is 
In order to identify the unique optimal credit guarantee, we need to compare the retailer's profits R (M 3 ) and R (M 4 ) within their respective sub-intervals. By substituting (10) into (5), we have
where 
where Q P =F −1 (c/w), and Q H = Q L (M 4 ) =F −1 (w/p). In the following, we firstly show that 1 
By the first order condition, we have
Moreover, since h (Q) = −pf (Q) < 0, h(Q) is concave and thus h(Q * ) > h(0) = 0, which indicates R 2 (M 4 ) > 0. Therefore, we have 1 (c, p) < 0.
The proof is complete.
Theorem 2: The retailer's optimal credit guarantee is
Proof: Given pc ≤ w 2 , we have M 4 ≤ M 2 . Therefore, R (M ) is non-increasing in the whole interval [0, +∞). As a consequence, the optimal credit guarantee, M * , can always be found at M = 0.
Given pc > w 2 , we have
. By Lemma 1, the retailer's optimal decision is M * = δ 1 (M 3 , M 4 ). The proof is complete.
Recall that Q P is the optimal solution for the newsvendor model without capital constraints. When B ≥ cQ P , the supplier has sufficient initial capital to produce Q P . By Theorem 2, the retailer's optimal credit guarantee M * is either 0 or M 4 . When M * = 0, our model reduces to the traditional newsvendor model and the transaction between the supplier and retailer retains a pull system in which the selling of goods is triggered by the supplier's production. When M * = M 4 , the retailer plays an active role in sharing inventory risk with the supplier, and the transaction in the supply chain turns to a push system.
To illustrate this change with BPOF contract, suppose p/w 1 and c/w close to 1, then Q P is close to 0. In traditional newsvendor model, the supplier faces the extremely high inventory risk and both the supplier and retailer suffer great losses. By Theorem 2, the retailer chooses to provide the credit guarantee M 4 , and thus the production quantity turns to beF −1 (w/p), which implies that the retailer becomes the newsvendor and the inventory risk has been transferred to the retailer.
As was shown, although BPOF contract is meant to mitigate the supplier's financial distress, it helps the supply chain to transfer the risk and get coordinated. With BPOF contract, the retailer bears a part of loss when the market demand is realized to be low.
V. SUPPLIER'S INITIAL CAPITAL IS LOW A. SUPPLIER'S OPTIMAL PRODUCTION QUANTITY
Theorem 3: Given the retailer's credit guarantee, M , the supplier's optimal production quantity is The proof is complete.
B. RETAILER'S OPTIMAL CREDIT GUARANTEE
By Theorem 3, (5) can be transformed to
It can be readily verified that S (M ) is continuous at M 1 and M 2 , respectively. Hence, S (M ) is continuous in VOLUME 7, 2019 [0, +∞). The first order derivative is
To characterize the optimal credit guarantee decision, we define
Lemma 2: For M 5 and B 1 , the following equivalent condition holds:
Proof: For convenience, we define the auxiliary function T (M ) as
. (20) It suffices to show the corresponding first order derivative is negative.
By the definitions of M 5 and B 1 , we have
The proof is complete. Lemma 3: If pc > w 2 , then B 1 < 0.
Proof: Given pc > w 2 , we have
where the first and the last inequality hold due to the Assumption 1.
When the retailer's credit guarantee is M 1 , her expected profit is (23) where Q P =F −1 (c/w), and Q H = Q L (M 4 ) =F −1 (w/p). In the following, we firstly show that 2 
Obviously , Then, we show that 1 (M 3 , M 4 ) < 0 can hold, too. Recall the auxiliary function defined by (13) . Given pc > w 2 , we have h(Q P ) − h(Q H ) < 0 since Q H is the maximizer of the function h(Q) and Q P = Q H . Suppose B = 0, we have
where the first inequality holds due to the Assumption 1. The proof is complete. For convenience, we define the critical point B 2 = {B| 2 = 0}. Then the equivalent condition 
(ii). if pc > w 2 , then
Proof: Recall the proof in Theorem 2. Given pc ≤ w 2 , we have M 4 ≤ M 2 and that R (M ) is non-increasing in interval [M 1 , +∞). As a consequence, the optimal credit guarantee, M * , can always be found in interval [0, M 1 ]. By Lemma 2, we have 
The proof is complete. As Theorem 4 is shown, when the supplier's initial capital is low, the retailer's optimal decision is always to provide credit guarantee, and the amount of credit guarantee is different under different conditions. Recall the definitions of three values, M 1 , M 4 , M 5 . M 1 is the gap between the supplier's initial capital and the funds needed to produce Q P . Moreover, we have M 4 > M 1 when the retailer's optimal credit guarantee is M 4 , and M 5 < M 1 when the retailer's optimal credit guarantee is M 5 .
Such a result reveals some interesting findings. On the condition that the supplier's initial capital is not sufficient to produce Q P units of products, if the supplier's initial capital is relatively high (but not as high as cQ P ), the retailer should offer the credit guarantee M 1 to make the supplier produce exactly Q P . However, if the supplier's initial capital is relatively low, the optimal credit guarantee for the retailer is not M 1 anymore. Instead, the retailer should make different decisions according to the relationship between the retailer's inventory risk and the supplier's inventory risk. If the retailer's inventory risk is lower than the supplier's, the retailer's optimal credit guarantee should increase from M 1 to M 4 . In other words, the retailer offers more credit guarantee than what needed to produce Q P . On contrary, if the retailer's inventory risk is no lower than the supplier's, then the retailer should decrease the credit guarantee from M 1 to M 5 . This phenomenon can be explained by Theorem 2, which states that if the supplier faces high inventory risk, the retailer should replace the supplier to be the newsvendor.
VI. CONCLUSION REMARKS
In this paper, we investigate the novel Buyer-backed Purchase Order Financing (BPOF) contract in which the large retailer helps the small budget-constrained supplier raise funds for production by providing credit guarantee to the bank. We build a two-stage Stackelberg game model, where the retailer first determines the amount of credit guarantee, and then the supplier determines production quantity. By assuming an extremely risk-averse single bank in the model, we characterize the optimal decisions for the retailer and supplier. Through analysis, we found that: (i) BPOF contract can help mitigate the small supplier's financial distress and improve the retailer's revenue. (ii) if the supplier's initial capital is less than a certain threshold, the retailer should provide credit guarantee to help the supplier get financing. Both the supplier and retailer benefit from BPOF contract. With BPOF contract, the budget-constrained supplier's production quantity can even increase to the level as the capital-unconstrained supplier has, under certain circumstances. (iii) Even if the supplier's initial capital is high, the retailer should still initiate BPOF contract, provided that the inventory risk of retailer is greatly lower than that of the supplier.
The policy implication of our research lies in that it enriches the present initiatives to promote SMEs' financing. In China, banks are generally reluctant to lend to small enterprises. Our study provides new insights to tackle this problem, if small enterprises are suppliers in a supply chain and they have large downstream retailers. To be specific, for small suppliers, seeking for the large retailer's credit guarantee is a feasible way to get bank loan, since the retailer shares a common motivation to support the supplier's production. Through BPOF contract, the small supplier's risk is shared by the retailer who provides credit guarantee. Credit guarantee scheme is the core of BPOF contract, and the guarantee itself is a form of collateral. If the retailer has a poor credit rating, banks will not provide loans [25] . The supplier's shortage of funds incurs insufficient product supply for the retailer, and in turn, brings a loss to the retailer's profit. Therefore, maintaining a good credit rating is critical to large retailers who cooperate with small suppliers.
In the future research, vast opportunities around this novel BPOF contract exist. First, we assume that the retailer, as the loan guarantor, has to compensate all of the bank's loss. In reality, some banks may not that risk-averse and the retailer may need to compensate only a part of the loss. With this change, the optimal decisions for supply chain members may different from our results. Therefore, it is meaningful to extend our model to the case with partial buyer-backed financing. Second, we consider the interest rate as exogenous parameter. Intuitively, if the bank actively engages in BPOF contract, then the bank has incentive to adjust the interest rate to motivate a larger amount of loan. In this regard, treating the interest rate as bank's decision variable would be another extension. Third, we consider a single financing instrument in our model. It is worth considering the scenario with multiple choices in the financing market, such as factoring and reverse factoring. It should be interesting to compare different financing instruments in the viewpoint of a well-capitalized retailer.
